In Defence of Quasi‐Contract by Priel, Dan
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
2012
In Defence of Quasi‐Contract
Dan Priel
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, dpriel@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Priel, Dan. "In Defence of Quasi‐Contract." The Modern Law Review 75.1 (2012): 54-77.
 The Indirect Influence of Politics on Tort Liability of 
Public Authorities in English Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dan Priel 
 
 
The scope of negligence liability of public authorities in English law has undergone 
significant changes in the Post-World War II period, first expanding and then, from the 
mid-1980s, retracting. This article tries to explain why this happened not by focusing, as is 
common in most commentary on this area of law, on changing doctrinal “tests,” but rather 
by tying it to changes in the background political ideology. My main contention is that 
political change has brought about a change in the law, but that it did so by affecting the 
scope of the political domain, and by implication, also the scope of the legal one. More 
specifically, I argue that Britain’s Post-War consensus on the welfare state has enabled the 
courts to expand state liability in accordance with emerging notions of the welfare state 
without seeming to take the law into controversial territory. When Thatcher came to 
power, the welfare state was no longer in consensus, thus making further development 
of legal doctrines on welfarist lines appear politically contentious. The courts therefore 
reverted back to older doctrines that seemed less politically charged in the new political 
atmosphere of the 1980s. 
 
In debates on the relationship between politics and law, two extreme views 
tend to occupy much of the discussion. At one end of the spectrum we see the 
view that law is simply a masquerade for politics. On this view, doctrinal 
analyses we find in judicial opinions are mere cover for what is really going 
on, namely politics. At the other extreme are those who think of law in 
political terms is to misunderstand what this law is all about (among 
others: Beever 2007:171–72; Oakeshott 1975:412; Stevens 2007:311). 
The former approach has been very influential in analysis of the work of 
American courts, in particular the Supreme Court. Following on the footsteps of 
the legal realists who have argued that the legal considerations found in 
judicial decisions often fail to explain the actual motivation behind the 
 decisions, many scholars of American courts have argued that the judges’ 
politics provide the best explanation of judicial opinions. Thus, according to 
two leading proponents of this view, “[s]imply put, Rehnquist votes the way he 
does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did 
because he is extremely liberal” (Segal & Spaeth 2002:86). 
This view is by no means universally accepted, but whatever its merits 
may be in explaining the United States Supreme Court, it is not clear how 
applicable it is to the analysis of other courts, especially those outside the 
U.S. American courts have long been unique in the degree to which they 
participate in the shaping of policy on politically divisive issues. In England, 
where legal realism has never had as much impact as it had in the United 
States (Duxbury 2005:54–69), the alternative, legalist, explanation still largely 
prevails. Accordingly, the legal reasons found in judicial opinions are still 
typically treated as the most reliable source for explaining the outcomes of 
cases and are closely analyzed by legal commentators. This scholarly 
difference reflects, I believe, an underlying difference in legal and political 
traditions. 
While there have been some efforts to argue that English courts are 
influenced by political considerations (e.g., Griffith 1997; Robertson 1998), 
they have been few and far between, and even they have resulted in 
considerable criticism (e.g., Lee 1988:33–39; Minogue 1978; both directed at 
Griffith). Even these rare studies focused more on public law, leaving the 
area of private law mostly to doctrinal scholarship, which is still the 
dominant form of scholarship among English private lawyers. The question 
 whether and how political ideology affects these areas of law was either 
unexamined,1 or explicitly denied (Stevens 2009:651–52). 
A full explanation for this difference is beyond the scope of this article, 
but I suspect it has to do with the different political traditions of the two 
countries. In England, the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy was 
understood to imply that political questions are the domain of Parliament 
(Tomkins 2005), and as a result courts, including the House of Lords (until 
recently the highest court for civil cases from all the United Kingdom), 
have shied away from involvement in politically controversial matters 
(Atiyah & Summers 1987:267–68).2 It is, I believe, in large part for this 
reason why legal realists have not had similar impact in England as they 
have in the United States. (After all, virtually all the important ideas 
associated with legal realism can be found in the work of Jeremy Bentham, 
who was by no means an obscure figure.) Though most of the realists said 
relatively little on politics, their ideas were more congenial and could be 
further developed in an environment in which law was increasingly 
entangled in political controversy. 
It is this gap that this article seeks to begin to fill by examining the effect 
of politics on English law in one particular area—negligence liability of 
public authorities. In the years following World War II we see a trend 
toward expansion of negligence liability of the state. Starting from cases 
in which state agents caused harm, later cases have imposed liability on 
the state when it failed to supervise or prevent others, typically private 
individuals, from causing harm. Then, from about the mid-1980s, we see a 
 reversal of the trend towards limitation of liability.3 Though there is vast 
doctrinal literature on the topic of negligence liability by the state, most of it 
seeks to explain changes in the law by focusing exclusively on analyzing 
legal concepts. The primary aim of this article is to show the limitations of 
doctrinal analysis in this area and to offer an alternative explanation. I do 
this by highlighting several aspects of the leading decisions in this area of 
law that received relatively little attention and explaining them in light of 
competing political views on the relationship between individual and 
state. 
The second aim of this article is more general. Although the specific 
ways in which law and politics interact are probably unique to every 
jurisdiction, what I purport to offer here is a different approach to 
thinking about the way politics can influence law. According to the more 
common explanation, captured neatly in the quote from Segal and Spaeth 
above, the political ideology of each individual judge influences her legal 
analysis. Even those who reject the sweep of this position are mainly 
concerned to show that alongside political ideology, legal doctrine has real 
impact on the outcome of cases. The debate is mainly about the relative 
impact of legal doctrine and political ideology on legal outcomes, not the 
mechanism by which politics influences law.4 
In this article I suggest that the different political traditions of England 
and the United States may also have an impact on the way in which politics 
influences law. I contend that where courts try to avoid dealing with 
politically contentious changes in the political scene, this can lead to 
 changes in what counts as political—and hence impermissible—argument, 
and by implication, in what counts as acceptable legal argument. As I will 
try to show below, an argument or outcome can be considered political or 
non-political at different times, thereby being more or less amenable for 
judicial use. The second aim of this article is to demonstrate this, indirect, 
influence of politics on law. 
I have a third, although more minor, aim in this article. I wish to draw 
attention to the significance of politics to the examination of private law 
doctrines.5 I am, of course, not the first to do that, yet despite a wealth of 
theoretical work on tort law, in recent times this perspective seems relatively 
unexplored, because the two most popular approaches to tort theory, moral 
philosophy and economics, do not give political considerations a central 
place. Those relying on moral philosophy for explaining tort doctrine usually 
try to understand and justify the rules in this area by assessing them 
against theories of individual moral responsibility. Such theories typically 
operate in relative autonomy from broader political or social contexts (as 
explicitly stated in e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky 2005:368, 391; Ripstein 
2004:1814–15, 1830). The very different economic analysis of tort law is 
surprisingly similar in this regard. In most economic analyses of tort law, the 
legal rules are explained by extending a microeconomic market model to 
tort situations. Under this approach tort liability is based on assessing the 
costs and benefits that accrue from various activities. Of course, these costs 
may be different for different actors, but most economic models do not call 
for any special treatment of the fact that the state is involved in the activity. 
 Thus, both approaches miss what I think is central to understanding tort law 
as it exists today, namely that it operates as part of (or at least alongside) the 
institutions of the welfare state. The significance of this fact is most acute in 
considering the scope of tort liability of public authorities, because one 
cannot adequately answer the question of what the state may be liable 
for in tort, unless one forms a view on what the state owes individuals. 
Though I do not explore this normative question in this article, the 
discussion here is meant to point to the need to address it. 
Before proceeding, a note on methodology: Much of the American 
literature on the ideological influence on courts is based on statistical 
analysis of vast datasets. There are very few such statistical studies 
examining English courts, and no publiclyavailable datasets.6 Instead, for 
the sake of examining the hypothesis that the law on the negligence liability 
of public authorities has been influenced by changing political attitudes, I 
rely on the traditional method of examining the central cases in the field, 
supplemented by some extra-judicial writings of active judges. Though 
judicial opinions do not always lend themselves to discerning political 
influence on judicial decision-making, I think there is enough evidence 
from court cases and judges’ writings to piece together an account of the 
influence of politics on the development of the law in this area. I will try to 
show how this political background helps us make more sense of some of 
the doctrinal arguments found in the law, as well as offer an account of the 
changes the law has undergone during the twentieth century. 
I start my argument by describing the change in legal doctrine in the 
 years following World War II and present some of the attempts to 
explain them. I show the limitations of doctrinal explanations and then 
consider various attempts to explain these changes by aligning them to 
ideological changes in the political system and, in particular, the rise of 
New Right ideology. In section II I begin to examine the plausibility of 
such explanations by describing the changing political attitudes towards 
public services in the years following World War II. I show that these changes 
were part of a broader change in attitude towards the role of the state, and 
that these changes have also led to a more social conception of tort liability, 
and in particular tort liability of public authorities. I then turn, in section 
III to outlining the arguments made in support of limiting tort 
liability of the state. I first present the arguments of the kind one would 
hear from someone committed to New Right ideology, the political 
ideology most associated with Margaret Thatcher. I then show that the 
actual arguments found in some of the most important court decisions 
concerning liability of public authorities during Thatcher’s premiership 
reflect a different ideology, one that in some sense is directly opposed to 
Thatcherite ideas. Finally, in section IV I attempt to explain these 
developments by providing several possible reasons why the Thatcherite 
approach did not find favor with the judges. My central argument is that 
ideology can bring about legal change not merely directly, by influencing 
judges to favor a certain interpretation of the law, but also indirectly by 
changing the scope of what counts as a nonpolitical, and hence legally 
acceptable, position. 
  
Explaining the Post-War Change in English Law on Negligence 
Liability of Public Authorities 
 
When trying to explain the doctrinal changes to the liability of public 
authorities it makes sense to begin by trying to show them as part of broader 
developments in negligence liability. According to the familiar story it 
was Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1978), coincidentally or not a 
government liability case, that ushered in the “two-stage test” which was 
rejected thirteen years later in favor of the seemingly more restrictive “three-
stage test” of Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman (1990).7 
Although it is tempting to explain the change in the area of liability 
of public authorities as the result of a more general shift in the scope of 
negligence liability, I do not think this explanation works. When the 
House of Lords overruled Anns it declared that the latter decision “did not 
proceed upon any basis of established principle, but introduced a new 
species of liability” (Murphy v. Brentwood (1991:471). The House said this 
even though earlier cases, in particular Dorset Yacht v. Home Office (1970) but 
also McGhee v. National Coal Board (1972) (both still considered good law 
today), adopted a very similar formulation to the one supposedly created 
out of whole cloth in Anns.8 
In fact, even the change in the “tests” is not particularly illuminating, 
especially if we bear in mind that the law lords themselves have frequently 
warned against paying too much attention to the verbal formulas that 
 govern the question of duty of care (Custom and Excise Commissioners v. Barclays 
Bank plc. (2006:[35]); Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman (1990:633)). The tests for 
duty of care in both Anns and Caparo are extremely vague, and it is not too 
difficult to reach post-Caparo outcomes using the Anns test, and vice versa. 
On the one hand, the House of Lords began narrowing liability for public 
authorities before the Anns test was officially overruled in 1990 
(Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson Co. Ltd. 
(1985); Yuen Kun Yeu v. A.G. (Hong Kong) (1988)). Similarly, the Canadian 
Supreme Court continues to adhere to the Anns “test,” even after its 
rejection in its country of origin; nonetheless, it recently moved closer to the 
post-Caparo English approach (Cooper (2000):[28], [37]–[39]). On the other 
hand, there are a few decisions from recent years that seem to have 
adopted a more expansive approach to duty of care in a manner more 
reminiscent of the spirit of Anns despite following the letter of Caparo. 
Still within the bounds of doctrine but focused more closely on the 
question of liability of public authorities, some have argued that the reason 
for the legal change in the 1980s was that the House of Lords had 
previously failed to distinguish between causing harm, for which liability 
should be imposed, and the failure to confer a benefit, which should lead 
to no liability (Bailey & Bowman 2000:87). The change in the law, then, was 
simply the result of the House of Lords’ recognition of “defect[s] in the . . . 
reasoning” of earlier decisions (Bailey & Bowman 2000:87), and its 
correction of “errors in legal analysis” (Stevens 2009:651). 
It is hard to accept such explanations as the whole story. The supposed 
 legal errors were made by a unanimous panel of the House of Lords and 
were then adopted by other courts in the Commonwealth. That would 
suggest that these courts did not make a doctrinal error, but that, for a while 
at least, the courts did not accept this distinction as relevant. Furthermore, 
English and Commonwealth courts commonly read each other’s decisions 
and are happy to borrow from each other. If this were a case of legal error, 
we would not expect the error to persist in other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions after English courts have pointed it out; and yet that is what we 
see.9 More to the point, the distinction between duty and failure to confer a 
benefit is one that presupposes a certain baseline of what the state is required 
to do, one that doctrine itself does not supply, and without which the 
distinction is empty. 
Doctrine alone is equally unhelpful if we wish to support the overruled 
decisions. True, to many contemporary commentators, and of course to 
the House of Lords itself, both Dorset Yacht and Anns seemed natural 
applications, or at least justified extensions, of Donoghue v. Stevenson 
(1932); but such determinations (or re-determinations) of the scope of 
earlier decisions are never required by the earlier decisions, so something else 
outside the cases must have been at work. 
My alternative suggestion is that we can gain some insight into this 
question by examining shifts in the dominant political ideology at the 
time. Surprisingly, there has been no detailed discussion of tort liability of 
public authorities, an area in which the impact of political ideas would 
seem more immediately relevant. One finds occasional comments that 
 acknowledge the impact of political ideology on the law (Cane 1982:62; 
Lunney & Oliphant 2010:542; cf. Stapleton 1995:820), and there are also brief 
comparative comments that seek to attribute the difference between 
English and French law in this area to the difference between English (or 
British) and French attitudes towards the state (Fairgrieve 2002:265–66; 
Monti 1999:772–73). But though a step in the right direction, these 
throwaway remarks—quite often not more than a sentence or two—are all 
too brief and general to explain the doctrinal puzzles mentioned above and 
in particular to the change in the attitude towards liability of public 
authorities in the 1980s. 
A more specific idea that falls firmly within this approach and that 
superficially provides a plausible answer to our puzzle, links the changes 
in the law to Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power and more specifically to 
the ideas now associated with her name. Perhaps most famous for this 
claim is Patrick Atiyah. Atiyah suggested that the law in the 1970s reflected 
a time “in which people still believed the role of the state is to take care of 
people ‘from the cradle to the grave’.” He suggested that some of the 
restrictions on tort liability against the state that came in the following 
decade reflect the rejection of this view (Atiyah 1997:140–41, 176; cf. 
1987:1027–28).10 Besides Atiyah, the influence of Thatcherism has been 
suggested by other prominent tort scholars as an explanation for various 
changes in tort liability that took place in this period, although, again, 
none of these claims has been developed in any detail (Cane 1996:483; 
Howarth 1991:65–66; Markesinis & Fedtke 2007:12–13;  Stanton  1991:84). 
 Despite its appeal, I will argue below that this suggestion is 
unsatisfactory. Though the change in the law may be attributed to 
“conservative judges” (Markesinis and Fedtke 2007:37, 64), when their 
views are actually examined, we find in them attitudes quite different from 
those one would expect to see from judges seeking to implement 
Thatcherite ideology. In the next section I begin to look at the political 
changes in Post-War Britain, changes that I will subsequently argue are 
relevant for understanding the changing law. 
 
The Changing State in Post-War Britain 
 
World War II forced many changes on British society. Among others, it 
was instrumental to long-lasting changes in attitudes on the proper “size” of 
government. In part, the War was instrumental to increases in social 
expenditure that began during the war years and which post-War 
governments found difficult to roll back to their pre-War levels (Dryzek & 
Goodin 1986:11–21); in part it was the disillusionment with laissez faire 
policies for their perceived responsibility for the War (Middleton 
1996:§11.3), and which helped legitimate the new tasks public authorities 
were now called to perform. These changing attitudes were aided by a 
stronger sense of solidarity between members of the different classes, as well 
as higher levels of trust in the state and its institutions (Marshall 1975:82–
84; Marwick 2003:80).11 
It was during these years that new welfare institutions, most notably 
 the National Health Service and Industrial Injuries Scheme, were created, 
and others that were already in place, like National Insurance, were 
expanded. Importantly, these developments were the work of both 
Labour and Conservative governments. In what are known as the 
consensus years following World War II there was relative similarity on 
many fundamental issues regarding the structure of the economy. 
Successive governments from both major parties supported a form of mixed 
economy, Keynesian economic policies, and commitment to the protection of 
the institutions of the welfare state (Kavanagh 1997:45–47, 71–72; Kavanagh 
& Morris 1994:76–77).12 Conservative politician Harold Macmillan serves as 
a useful example. In 1938 he published The Middle Way (Macmillan 1938), a 
book inspired by the country whose economic model has over the years come 
to symbolize benign socialism, Sweden.13 When twenty years later he 
became Prime Minister, Macmillan reiterated his commitment to the book’s 
main tenets.14 For him, patriotism meant that the state had parent-like 
obligations to care for its citizens and to make sure that the less fortunate 
among them were not left behind (Green 2002:160–62). 
The consensus years and the expansion of the welfare state were 
reflected not only in the creation and expansion of new social institutions, 
but also in a slow but steady expansion of tort liability against the state and 
employers. This expansion in effect reoriented tort law towards becoming a 
mechanism for the optimal allocation of risks among different groups in 
society.15 The Beveridge Report, which laid down the intellectual 
foundations and provided a blueprint for the welfare institutions that were 
 soon afterwards created, contained a short discussion of the role of tort 
liability as one of the means for dealing with industrial accidents and 
proposed to replace it with an administrative procedure that was part of a 
more comprehensive welfare scheme (Beveridge Report 1942:130–31). 
Shortly afterwards, legislation was introduced to abolish the defense of 
common employment and to eliminate the immunity of state bodies from 
private law claims. 
The change in political mood, and the statutory developments it begat, 
have been noticed in academic commentary. Academic lawyers writing at 
the time started talking about this area of law in terms of what it “does” 
(instead of what it “is”), and increasingly this question was answered by 
considering its role within the welfare state (Denning 1949:72–75, 77–81; 
Friedmann 1972:ch. 5; Williams 1951). Towards the end of this period, many 
found tort law wanting and have suggested more or less radical reforms to it, 
from no-fault liability for accidents to the replacement of the law with 
social insurance schemes (Atiyah 1970:611–14; Ison 1967; and from judges 
writing extra-judicially: Kilbrandon 1966:32–33, 42–43; Parker 1965:9–11). 
Even though these reforms were not adopted, the fact that they were 
suggested is a good indication of what was by then the mainstream academic 
view as to the appropriate way of thinking about tort law in the modern 
state. 
These changing political and social attitudes have also affected judicial 
attitudes on doctrines within tort law. In the area that is the focus of this 
article we can begin with East Suffolk River Catchment Board v. Kent (1941), a 
 case in which a majority of the House of Lords rejected a claim against 
public authorities for being unreasonably slow in fixing a broken wall, which 
the plaintiffs contended resulted in losses from high tides. The majority’s 
opinion was premised on a dichotomy between powers and duties: whenever 
public authorities are given powers to act it follows that they cannot be 
under a duty to act. As the authority only had a power to act, its failure to 
act more quickly could not give rise to liability. In dissent Lord Atkin rejected 
the dichotomy: being given a public (statutory) power does not entail that one 
is not also under a common law duty to take reasonable care not to injure 
others, a duty that existed “whether a person is performing a public duty, or 
merely exercising a power which he possesses either under statutory 
authority or in pursuance of his ordinary rights as a citizen” (East Suffolk 
1941:89).16 
To see how the law changed in the years following East Suffolk we need 
to identify two different developments, since it is only by understanding the 
way both have operated together that we can make sense of the expansion 
of state liability. The first (and more familiar) change is the emergence of a 
general duty of care and a general tort of negligence. Though this 
development is rather familiar now, it is easy to forget how long it took. 
Donoghue, now read to have established a new general tort of negligence, 
did not become a leading case overnight.17 It was probably only in the 
1960s that it began to be understood in this way (e.g., Diplock 1965:2), 
with the definitive statement found in Dorset Yacht v. Home Office.18 In 
holding for the plaintiffs Lord Reid said that though “the well-known 
 passage” from Lord Atkin’s opinion in Donoghue “should not be treated as if 
it were a statutory definition . . . it ought to apply unless there is some 
justification or valid explanation for its exclusion” (1970:1027). This view was 
further entrenched in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1978:757).19 
Writing for a unanimous panel Lord Wilberforce explained the apparent 
difference between the decision and the majority’s opinion in East Suffolk by 
stating that “the conception of a general duty of care . . . had not at the time 
[of East Suffolk] become fully recognised.” This was a polite way of overruling 
East Suffolk in favor of Lord Atkin’s dissent (an opinion thought, 
unsurprisingly, to have had a better grasp of the principle established in 
Donoghue). 
Next to this familiar development, there was a second, much less 
familiar, change in judicial attitudes about the relationship between the 
individual and the state. Perhaps because they felt freer to express their 
broader view on developments in the law in extra-judicial writings, it is 
mostly there that we can identify this change. As early as 1953 Lord 
Radcliffe explained that this was “the Century of the Plaintiff,” because of 
“[t]he widespread use of insurance, so that people have come to feel that 
there is no loss or mischance that ought not somehow to be made good to 
the sufferer—by someone else.” He added further that as “so much of 
industry and public activity is now conducted by large impersonal 
corporations with large impersonal resources . . . it hardly seems even 
unkind to make them pay for every sort of damage that an individual may 
have met with at their hands.” It was, he concluded, “humanitarianism,” the 
 sense that makes people “indignant” to learn that “there can be grievances 
in all the dark and irresponsible record of human affairs which the law is 
not equipped with a remedy to put right” (Radcliffe 1968:32–33; cf. 
Macmillan 1937:6–8, 279–83; Nettleship v. Weston 1971:699), that led to the 
change in legal attitude. 
It is important to recognize that this new conception of the 
relationship between the individual and the state was something that 
judges at the time were fully aware of. The more influential judges of the 
time quite clearly recognized that these political changes had implications 
not only for public law; they also required reshaping tort law to better fit the 
new reality of the modern welfare state which was at the heart of the post-
War consensus.20 Their refashioning of tort law, and especially the tort of 
negligence, was a conscious attempt to make sure the law remained in line 
with the changes that were taking place outside the law. The main tool was 
an increasingly frequent acknowledgement of the significance of “policy” 
considerations (Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office 1969:426–27; Reid 
1972:27; Radcliffe 1960:40–41). In one particularly clear statement Lord 
Radcliffe (1960:57) criticized the English courts for taking the wrong kind 
of considerations into account when appealing to public policy. What they 
should consider is not so much “what the State or the public requires in its 
own interest,” but rather “what the public should guarantee to the 
individual for the protection of his essential dignity.” 
On the more traditional understanding of tort law, it belongs firmly 
within “private law”; as such it is only concerned with redressing private 
 wrongs and any suggestion that it should be affected by the changing 
relationship between individual and the state would be misplaced. But the 
combined effect of the two developments just described has been to 
provide a radically new understanding of tort law as part of the machinery 
of the welfare state. Thus, in Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners 
Ltd. (1964:536) Lord Pearce said that the scope of the duty of care had to be 
based “upon the courts’ assessment of the demands of society for protection 
from the carelessness of others.”21 Speaking more generally in Broome v. 
Cassell & Co. Ltd. (No. 1) (1972:1114), Lord Wilberforce, who would go on 
to deliver the main speech in Anns only a few years later, rejected the view 
that it is always the “criminal law, rather than the civil law [that is] . . . the 
better instrument for conveying social disapproval, or for redressing a wrong 
to the social fabric. . . .” And around the same time Lord Denning, who has 
cast considerable influence on the development of tort law in this period, 
wrote that the “reason why the law of negligence has been extended so as 
to embrace nearly all activities in which people engage . . . is that, when 
severe loss is suffered by any one singly, it should be borne, not by him 
alone, but be spread throughout the community at large.” Even the 
requirement of fault that was still retained in the law was not explained 
by appeal to any moral or legal notion of rights, but simply because 
“compensation without fault would make society bankrupt” (Denning 
1979:280). 
It is interesting to see how the two developments were used to overcome 
doctrinal hurdles that stood in the way of developing the law in what was 
 thought to be the desired direction. The broad reading of Donoghue in the 
context of Dorset Yacht and Anns established the idea that as far as the 
citizen is concerned the state is its “neighbour” for much of what it does. 
Typically, Lord Denning was clearest on this front. In Dutton v. Bognor Regis 
Urban District Council, decided a few years before Anns, and likewise 
dealing with the liability of public authority for failure to inspect poor 
construction by private contractors, he wrote: “[The local council] were 
entrusted by Parliament with the task of seeing that houses were properly 
built. They received public funds for the purpose. The very object was to 
protect purchasers and occupiers of houses. Yet they failed to protect them. 
Their shoulders are broad enough to bear the loss” (1972:398). This was 
the political consensus on the welfare state translated into legal doctrine. 
Dutton is important for another, and perhaps more significant, doctrinal 
innovation that clearly reflects the second development mentioned earlier. 
As we have seen, the majority in East Suffolk has taken the existence of a 
statutory power as excluding the possibility of a duty, dooming the claim. 
Lord Denning overcame this conflicting (and formally binding) case by 
dismissing the distinction drawn there between power and duty. The 
distinction was a “mistake,” he said, because when considering “the 
functions of a local authority” there is a more applicable “middle term”: the 
public authority had “control” over “every stage of the work” (Dutton 
1972:391–92).22 Control is the kind of relation that exists between 
individuals and the state, and it is one that is markedly different from the 
relationship that exists between individuals who are more-or-less equally 
 situated. State authorities have “control” because they can compel 
compliance with their requirements, and this control implies a duty of care. 
Because the state had control over the situation, the distinction drawn in 
East Suffolk between harms that were the result of risks caused by actions of 
the defendant and cases of harm resulting from risks created by natural 
causes could be rejected. When the state was given (or has taken) control 
for the sake of reducing risks, it mattered little whether the risk was created 
by the state.23 
Of the two developments just described—the emergence of a general 
duty of care and the reorientation of the relationship between individuals 
and the state in the context of tort claims—most academic attention has been 
directed to the first. It is the development that could more easily be 
identified, could be thought relevant to “private” law and, whether liked or 
not, could be explained in terms of familiar legal categories. The second 
development, by contrast, challenged the separation between private law 
and public law and hovered close to the boundary between law and politics. 
Ignoring this second development, it is not surprising that some 
commentators found Anns and the decisions following it difficult to 
understand and ended up explaining it as the result of “errors in legal 
analysis” (Stevens 2009:651). But with the change in the relationship 
between individual and the state as part of the picture Anns makes 
perfect sense. It reflects a concerted effort to adapt the law to the new state 
responsibilities brought about by the new institutions of the welfare state. 
 
  
The Thatcher Years 
 
By the time Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister there was a 
growing sense that something had gone wrong with Britain, that it became 
“ungovernable.” More and more people have come to accept the view that 
it was the welfare state, hitherto untouchable, that was to blame for many of 
the ills that befell British society in the late 1970s. Before Thatcher came to 
power major reforms in public services were sometimes mooted, but not 
much was done (Lowe 1994:48–49). Thatcher, backed by growing public 
discontent, sought radical change. Informed by an ideology that looked at all 
government institutions with mistrust, she was eager to reorganize public 
authorities and in particular the institutions of the welfare state. She disliked 
government because she thought it tended to divert talented people away 
from wealth-creating business to business-stifling bureaucracy; she 
particularly disliked the institutions of the welfare state for encouraging a 
culture of dependency instead of a culture of responsibility (Harris 
1988:22–23). 
It was not just the welfare state that Thatcher wanted to change, it was 
also the political consensus that brought it about. As she put it “consensus 
seems to be the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values, and 
policies” (quoted in Kavanagh & Morris 1994:2). The decline in solidarity 
and trust of government (Harris 1986:256–57) suggests she was not alone. 
The question I explore in this section is whether these shifts had an impact on 
 the judiciary in the area of liability of public authorities, and if they did, what it 
was. 
 
New Right in the House of Commons: The State Can Only Do Wrong 
Commentators disagree on the extent to which Thatcher (or 
Thatcherism) is a continuation of conservative ideas or a departure from 
them.24 It is clear, though, that Thatcher had little patience for Burkean 
incrementalism or the protection of institutions just because they 
withstood the test of time. Nor did she harbor Oakeshottean suspicions of 
“rationalist” attempts at “political science.” Thatcher believed that one 
could glean from the works of the likes of Friedrich von Hayek or Milton 
Friedman guiding principles for reform of government and society. If those 
called for major changes to, or even the elimination of, old institutions, so 
be it. 
How does this ideology translate to liability of public authorities? At 
first, it may seem to favor the expansion of liability of public authorities. 
According to this view, public authorities should be treated just like 
private service providers, and therefore should be liable for “breach” 
whenever they fail to live up to promised standard (for such suggestions 
coming from the Institute of Economic Affairs, the most prominent British 
New Right think-tank, see Mather 1991:73–75, 82–84, 87–88). But in reality, 
the attitude has been quite different, for reasons that are not difficult to 
see. This may have something to do with worries that broader liability may 
lead to undesired expansion of state institutions needed to handle all those 
 claims. Mostly, however, the objection to such liability can be explained 
by moral arguments that have to do with the perceived detrimental 
impact that expanding liability of public authorities would have on the 
“Victorian values” of personal responsibility (cf. Travers 1977:163, 175–81).25 
Expanding the scope of tort liability on the state effectively turns it into an 
insurer of last resort, one that potentially covers all possible activities. 
Thatcher’s famous dictum that “there is no such thing as a society” is often 
said by her defenders to have been taken out of context. When brought 
into context it is clear that she was concerned about a society in which people 
do not take responsibility for their actions, and are given by an over-
pampering state disincentives for selfimprovement.26 It is thus an 
individualistic call for greater selfreliance and responsibility, and—what is 
merely the other side of the same coin—the demand that they stop looking 
to “blame others for their misfortunes” (Atiyah 1997:138; cf. Cane 
2006:462). 
This link between welfare and morality makes familiar New Right 
ideas easy to translate into arguments against the expansion of tort liability 
of public authorities. If tort law is understood as a system of personal 
responsibility,27 then it would be a mistake, moral and conceptual, to 
introduce welfarist considerations into it by expanding liability of public 
authorities. A basic premise of this view is that a responsible, planning 
person should take possible future misfortunes into consideration when 
deciding on future action. On this view it is the injured person’s failure to 
consider possible mishaps and to protect herself against them (by reducing 
 the level of activity or investing in safety measures to reduce the risk of harm, 
or by purchasing insurance to reduce the impact of the harm) that is 
responsible for her misery. On many occasions it is the “victim” who will be 
in a better position than anyone else, both epistemically and morally, to 
consider potential harm that might befall her. At its most extreme, this 
view contends that there is nothing to distinguish the risk of harm from, 
say, an earthquake from the risk of harm brought about by the actions of 
other people: both are foreseeable setbacks for which one often can, and 
therefore should, adequately prepare in advance (Epstein 1996:293; Kaplow 
2003:177; cf. Spigelman 2002:433). Even if the plaintiff is not similarly 
situated to prevent an injury from occurring, she is typically in a position 
to decide for herself whether and to what degree she wishes to deal with 
its potential impact.28 In any case, the state has no role in being involved in 
what are private relations between individuals. 
A related but somewhat different way of getting to similar 
conclusions emphasizes the importance of choice. Thatcher is reported to 
have said that “Choice is the essence of morality” (quoted in Jordan 1989:19 
n.1; similar quotes are found in Finlayson 1994:358–59) and expansion of 
tort liability might be thought to remove this choice. The rational, 
planning person should be given the choice between protecting herself 
against potential risks and running the risk, as well as the choice, if she 
elects to protect herself against the risk, on how to do so. By imposing tort 
liability on the state for failure to protect from the acts of others, the law 
removes potential victims’ ability to choose between engaging in an 
 uninsured but cheaper activity or an insured but more expensive one, and 
effectively adds compulsory insurance to the costs of the activity to 
which all have to pay through their taxes (Huber 1990:207–19). In other 
words, from this perspective expansion of tort liability both creates moral 
hazards by providing incentives for people to take less care of 
themselves and can operate to remove the choice of those people who wish 
to take responsibility over themselves. 
This is what one would have expected to see in judicial opinions from the 
mid-1980s if the judges at the time had been influenced by Thatcherite ideas. I 
argue in what follows that we do not see such views in the decisions; in fact, 
we find in them quite different views. 
 
Old Tories in the House of Lords: The State Can Do No Wrong 
The New Right ideas were by no means unanimously favored by 
members of Thatcher’s party. Many prominent members of the 
Conservative party’s old guard believed Thatcher’s views had little to do 
with the Tory tradition with which the party had been associated for a long 
time. Harold Macmillan, by then styled Earl of Stockton, spent the last 
years of his life bitterly criticizing his party’s government for getting “nothing 
right” (quoted in Evans 1998:27). Another former Conservative prime 
minister, Edward Heath, was similarly critical of the Thatcher government 
for losing its way (Finlayson 1994:366–67; Evans 1997:608–10). 
My argument is that the retrenchment of liability in the 1980s is closer 
to the views of these critics of Thatcher rather than to her own views. At 
 least in the decade in which the change in scope of tort liability began, it is 
not easy to find court decisions that express the same suspicious attitude 
towards public authorities and the same veneration of personal 
responsibility;29 what one does find in judicial opinions from this period are 
the sort of considerations that have been described as the “traditional 
Conservative ideals” of “strong government, patriotism, and authority” 
(Crewe & Searing 1988:365). 
To proponents of this approach the state should retain under its control 
certain inherently “public” services, not just by declining to privatize them, 
but also by refusing to conceive of them in contractual terms. The 
“paternalism” between the state and the individual is the relation that exists 
between subjects and the patria, that is, one that reflects the “despotism of 
parenthood” (Scruton 1984:110– 11).30 These ideas were part of a “Tory 
culture” that emphasized “deferential attitudes towards authority . . . [an] 
anti-egalitarian ethos and . . . status hierarchy” (Gamble 1994:170; Johnson 
1985:226–27, 234–35, 248). Where Burke spoke of the “generous loyalty to 
rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that 
subordination of the heart” (Burke 1968:170), latterday Tories explained 
that “[i]t is the absolute duty of the state to have power over its subject . . 
. [and] therefore [the state must] withdraw from every economic 
arrangement which puts it at the absolute mercy of individual citizens” 
(Scruton 1984:111). This patrician Tory tradition thus rejected both the idea 
that state institutions are dangerous entities whose domain should be 
curtailed as much as possible and the one that saw citizens as customers who 
 are in a position to make demands from it. 
It is almost inevitable that this approach assumes public authorities to 
be populated by competent, altruistically-motivated, public servants.31 And it 
is this attitude that one finds in the central cases on liability of public 
authorities from the 1980s. Perhaps the clearest encapsulation is found in 
Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1989), one of the leading cases in the 
trend towards limiting liability of public authorities. This case involved a 
claim by the mother of the last victim of a serial murderer and rapist. There 
were indications that the police forces ignored relevant evidence that 
could have led to an earlier capture of the perpetrator. The mother 
alleged that had the police acted with greater vigilance, the murderer would 
have been caught earlier, and her daughter would have been spared. Such a 
case could have been dismissed on failure to prove causation or carelessness 
on part of the police. Instead, the case was dismissed for lack of duty of care. 
In the course of explaining why, Lord Keith said (1989:63): 
 
Potential existence of [tort] liability [of public authorities] may in many 
instances be in the general public interest, as tending towards the 
observance of a higher standard of care in the carrying on of various 
different types of activity. I do not, however, consider that this can be said 
of police activities. The general sense of public duty which motivates 
police forces is unlikely to be appreciably reinforced by the imposition of 
such liability so far as concerns their function in the investigation and 
suppression of crime. From time to time they make mistakes in the 
exercise of that function, but it is not to be doubted that they apply their 
 best endeavours to the performance of it. 
 
Lord Keith was not alone. Calveley v. Chief Constable of Merseyside (1989) 
dealt with a claim by police officers who were suspended on allegations 
of misconduct that were later found to have been unfounded. Claiming 
negligence on part of the investigating officers, they sued for the wages 
they lost during their suspension. Again, the claim was dismissed not on 
its merits, but rather on the basis of lack of duty of care. In his decision Lord 
Bridge expressed (1989:1238) a view very similar to Keith’s: 
 
it would plainly be contrary to public policy, in my opinion, to prejudice 
the fearless and efficient discharge by police officers of their vitally 
important public duty of investigating crime by requiring them to act 
under the shadow of a potential action for damages for negligence by the 
suspect. 
 
It is tempting to think that this attitude was confined only to the police, 
against whom British courts have a long history of timidity (Stevens 
2005:75), but similar statements are found in cases dealing with other public 
authorities. In another opinion by Lord Keith, in Rowling v. Takaro Properties 
Ltd. (1988), this time in a Privy Council decision on an appeal from New 
Zealand, he wrote (1988:502) with regard to a claim against a minister who 
made an administrative decision that caused harm to an individual that 
 
in the nature of things, it is likely to be very rare indeed that an error of 
 law of this kind by a minister or other public authority can properly be 
categorised as negligent. As is well known, anybody, even a judge, can be 
capable of misconstruing a statute; and such misconstruction, when it occurs, 
can be severely criticised without attracting the epithet “negligent.” 
Obviously, this simple fact points rather to the extreme unlikelihood of a 
breach of duty being established in these cases. . . . 
 
Though this discussion looks as though it deals with the question of breach of 
duty, it appears in the judgment under the heading of duty of care and it 
led him to the very restrictive view that in general “it would . . . be in the 
public interest that citizens should be confined to their remedy . . . in those 
cases where the minister or public authority has acted in bad faith” 
(Rowling 1988:502). Maintaining the rule of law, the importance of subjecting 
executive action to legal oversight, and the retrospective application of legal 
interpretation, could all have swayed the decision in a different direction, 
but in the end it was the traditional Tory attitude toward state institutions 
that carried the day.32 
A final example, this time dealing with a local authority, comes from a 
somewhat later decision from the Court of Appeal. M. v. Newham London 
Borough Council (1995) consolidated several claims. One was a claim by a 
mother and child who were separated for almost a year as a result of a 
mistaken diagnosis that the mother’s partner was sexually abusing the 
child. The other claims involved the opposite situation, of children who 
sued the public authorities for their failure to separate them from abusive 
 families. All claims were dismissed. In the Court of Appeal Lord Justice 
Staughton stated  (1995:675–76): 
 
One advantage that is claimed for imposing a duty of care is that it 
encourages people not to be negligent. . . . [But] even if psychiatrists and 
social workers were likely to have to pay damages personally, I do not 
suppose that they would be any less caring for children in need than they are 
already; they might, as I have said, adopt defensive practices; but I doubt if 
their general level of care would change.33 
 
Even when not stated explicitly, this attitude helps explain the widely-
discussed “defensiveness” argument, found in many decisions restricting 
liability against public authority. (In fact, in Hill it appears immediately after 
the passage quoted above from the decision.34) This argument alleges that 
the imposition of liability on public services is likely to lead to an overly 
defensive attitude of the public authority. The defensiveness argument has 
been (rightly) criticized by commentators for lacking in empirical support 
and recently some judges expressed unease about it (Brooks v. Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis 2005:[6]). But this argument makes much more 
sense if we assume that public services are populated by officials who are 
altruistically-motivated and (the occasional mistake aside) are doing a good 
job. If this is the case, it follows that any imposition of liability on public 
officials will inevitably lead to overdeterrence and to the feared 
defensive frame of mind. Without such an assumption any general claim 
 on the likely effect of the imposition of more extensive liability on public 
services is unwarranted. 
In none of the cases discussed above was this line of argument the only 
one mentioned. Perhaps next to the other arguments the words quoted 
above have appeared like rhetorical flourishes; and it may be that for this 
reason this particular argument against the imposition of tort liability has 
received relatively little academic attention. But there is no reason to 
ignore an argument that appears in many of the central decisions in this 
area, especially as essentially the same argument is found in East Suffolk 
Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent, the case that provided the doctrinal and 
intellectual foundation for Hill and the cases that followed it. In East 
Suffolk Lord Thankerton said that “there are special circumstances in the case 
of statutory bodies . . . which should lead to the application of a less 
exacting standard than ordinarily prevails,” because in the circumstances in 
which they operate “much may be condoned as well-meant error of 
judgment” (East Suffolk 1941:95–96). 
To highlight the uniqueness of this ideological perspective it is worth 
comparing it to its two main competitors considered above. First, consider 
the attitude found in a tort law textbook (McBride & Bagshaw 2005:203 n.55, 
quoting McKinstry 2002), whose explanations of the law are often informed 
by New Right ideology: 
 
While we would agree with one commentator that “fraud, laziness, 
ineptitude and money-grabbing are the hallmark of Britain’s public sector” . 
 . . it is not clear that finding that a duty of care was owed in this kind of 
case would bring about any improvement in the dismal performance of 
public bodies in the UK. . . . [E]xpanding the scope of public bodies’ 
liability in negligence only serves to starve them of the money they 
need to perform their services, as more and more of their funding is 
diverted into paying for litigation and making compensation payments to 
claimants.35 
 
Though this book aims to explain existing doctrine, the position it adopts is 
clearly at odds with what one finds in East Suffolk and its 1980s progeny. For 
one, the negative view of public bodies it takes is very different from what 
we find in the cases. Furthermore, in line with New Right ideology, the 
book argues that public bodies should be treated in the same way as 
private bodies (McBride & Bagshaw 2005:206; discussed further in Priel 
2011:20–22), whereas the cases favored a more restrictive attitude to state 
liability. 
Even more interestingly, the attitude found in the 1980s cases is also 
fundamentally different from the view one finds during the period of 
political consensus on the welfare state. In Dorset Yacht the imposition of tort 
liability was challenged by the suggestion that it would lead to an overly 
defensive attitude. After quoting from a New York Court of Appeal decision 
that relied on the defensiveness argument to limit liability on public 
authorities, Lord Reid, one of the leading architects of the reformulation of 
negligence liability along welfarist lines, famously said: 
  
It may be that public servants in the State of New York are so 
apprehensive, easily dissuaded from doing their duty, and intent on 
preserving public funds from costly claims, that they could be influenced in 
that way. But my experience leads me to believe that Her Majesty’s servants 
are made of sterner stuff. . . . I can see no good ground in public policy for 
giving immunity to a Government Department (Dorset Yacht 1970:1033). 
 
Like the 1980s cases (and unlike the New Right view), Lord Reid’s words 
show a positive attitude towards public authorities. Where he differed from 
them is in coupling this position with a view regarding the changing role of 
the state. Consequently, he refused to take the deferential attitude towards 
public authorities that played such a central role in the limitation on liability 
in subsequent years. As we have seen, the decisions from the consensus years 
agreed with the earlier (and later) position that public authorities should be 
treated differently from private defendants, but maintained that the 
difference favored broader liability. 
 
 
What Explains the Change in Doctrine? 
 
What I have sought to show so far is a missing piece in the 
explanations of the doctrine on negligence liability of public authority in 
English law. I claimed that arguments that most commentators in the field 
consider to be irrelevant appear in the most important decisions and have 
 influenced the outcome of these decisions. In this section I try to show how this 
perspective can help us understand the broad doctrinal trends described in 
the beginning of this article. 
As judges do not usually discuss such matters openly, this section is 
somewhat more speculative, but I think we can offer a plausible account of 
the influence of politics on law in this context. To do that we must distinguish 
between two different ways in which politics can influence the law. One is 
the more familiar direct influence model, according to which the judges’ 
(or the general public’s) political opinion influences the law. On this view 
judicial opinions are “smokescreens” (Markesinis et al. 1999:39) for what 
really drives the decision, which implies that if judges claim to be basing 
their judgments exclusively on legal arguments, they are either lying or 
deluded. This is the model of political influence presupposed both by 
those who think English law can be explained in political terms (e.g., Griffith 
1997) and those who reject this view (Stevens  2009:651–52). 
It is impossible to rule out that English judges are influenced by political 
opinions. Like other human beings they see the world from a certain 
perspective, and in a country in which “[t]he national culture is Tory 
culture” (Johnson 1985:234; and Devlin 1978:505– 06, admitting that this 
outlook is true of the senior English judges), they may have hardly noticed 
the political undertones of the view they took in the 1980s: the traditional 
Tory ideas that made their way into their decisions may have just seemed 
natural to them.36 But I take seriously the various institutional constraints 
created in English law to keep law and politics apart (these include a 
 strong doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, stricter adherence to 
precedent, limited use of non-legal materials in litigation, non-political 
process of judicial appointments, more formal legal education), and believe 
that English courts have had some success in limiting the direct impact of 
politics (Priel 2012:325–27).37 Yet even in such an environment, I believe 
there is a different way in which politics can influence the law. Unlike the 
direct influence view, according to which judges are engaged in politics 
even when claiming to base their decision on the law, the model of indirect 
influence seeks to show that political change can shift the boundaries of what 
counts as political and by implication what counts as legal, thereby shifting the 
boundaries of “permissible” legal argument. (Of course, the indirect model 
does not rule out the possibility of direct influence of politics of law.) 
To understand the indirect model, it is necessary to distinguish first 
between two close but different senses of politics. A view may be considered 
“political” in the sense that it touches on questions relating to the 
organization of community; and it can also be “political” in the sense that it 
is subject to political controversy. It is not difficult to show that there are 
certain “political” assumptions underlying the private law in the first 
sense. To give one obvious example, private law presupposes the 
legitimacy of private property, and that is not a neutral political 
assumption. This political assumption, however, is one that is 
uncontroversial within the political mainstream of most Western countries. It 
is thus not political in the second sense, because basing their decisions on this 
assumption does not require judges to justify their decisions by appeal to 
 arguments that are external to the law. In such cases politics is embedded 
into the legal doctrine in a way that allows one to justify a decision by 
appeal only to “internal” legal materials. Politics becomes problematic for 
(English) lawyers when it is not so embedded into the law, and this most 
commonly happens when political issues in question are publicly 
controversial. 
American courts have a long history of deciding on matters that were 
controversial in exactly this sense (slavery, school segregation, abortion, 
health care, and so on). Much of the theoretical work in this field is 
therefore dedicated to articulating that role and to devising institutional 
mechanisms that will allow courts to consider politically controversial 
matters without deciding them on their political merits (Priel 2013). 
Competing theories of interpretation, the search for “neutral principles,” 
the distinction between principles and policies—these are all means used 
by American courts and academic lawyers in order to allow law to have a 
say in some political controversies while remaining outside of it. (Whether 
these mechanisms succeed is another matter.) 
English courts have taken a different approach: rather than develop 
mechanisms for distinguishing between proper and improper engagement in 
politics, they have traditionally simply left political matters to politicians.38 But 
even in a jurisdiction in which courts are concerned to keep out of politics, 
political change can still have indirect influence when it affects what is 
politically controversial. As mentioned before, for years after World War II 
the welfare state was a mainstream political position in Britain, as 
 commitment to its protection and even expansion was shared by the two 
major political parties. As such, support for it was no longer seen as political 
in the second sense mentioned above. (Indeed, given that contestation 
belonged to the political fringes, opposition to the welfare state would 
have been seen as political in the forbidden sense.) When no longer politically 
controversial, the welfare state became one more fact about the world that 
judges had to take into account in maintaining their historical role of 
shaping the path of the common law to fit changing circumstances. The 
courts could thus explain their doctrinal innovations as part of what 
uncontroversially is part of their job (cf. Devlin 1979:2). 
Once the consensus on the welfare state evaporated, once Thatcher’s 
views had become so prominent in the discourse, the scope of the welfare 
state moved to the center of political contestation. In this new environment 
the following earlier decisions might have seemed part of a broader agenda of 
promoting “social justice,” something that by then was a partisan (and for 
this reason offlimits) concern for a judge (cf. Devlin 1979:8). For the very 
same reason adopting the New Right’s approach to the problem would 
have been equally unappealing for the judges, for it too could not be 
presented in non-political terms, it too was the product of a political 
ideology. Against this background, resurrecting the majority opinion of East 
Suffolk (and dismissing much of the development that came after it as having 
no “basis of established principle”) may have seemed the most politically 
neutral route. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
James Callaghan, Margaret Thatcher’s predecessor, famously said 
(quoted in Morgan 1997:697): 
 
There are times, perhaps once every thirty years, when there is a sea-change 
in politics. It then does not matter what you say or what you do. There is 
a shift in what the public wants and what it approves of. I suspect there is 
now such a sea-change—and it is for Mrs. Thatcher. 
 
When such a shift occurs, more than anything else it changes the frame of 
reference of old debates: some views that until then would have been 
considered beyond the pale become part of acceptable discourse; and, if 
only for some time, other views that had been part of the debate become 
obsolete. What I have argued in this article is that it can also change the 
boundaries of political argument, and thereby, at least in some contexts, the 
boundaries of acceptable legal argument. 
  
 Notes 
 
1 For instance, in 1989 special issue of the Journal of Law Society dedicated to “Thatch- er’s Law,” the 
topics considered included privatization, education policy, housing, but not one of the papers discussed 
private law. The same is true of Zellick’s (1989) survey of Thatcher’s influence on law. 
2 It must be this view about the relative independence of law and politics that explains why it is not 
just academic lawyers but British political scientists who have also shown relatively little interest in 
the work of the courts (as attested in Drewry 2009). The stands in stark contrast to the situation in the 
United States where much of the work examining the political orientation of judges has been 
conducted by political scientists 
3 Though subsequent periods raise interesting questions themselves, due to space constraints I 
limit myself to the period of roughly 1940–1990. 
4 Some of the American literature has focused on how strategic behavior affects judges’ behavior. 
Epstein and Knight (1998) (among others) have argued that the need to attain on a majority on a panel, 
to avoid overturning of the decision on appeal, and concerns about retaliation from other branches of 
government or the general public, limit judges’ ability to decide simply according to their political 
preferences. These are all constraints that belong to what I call the direct impact of politics. 
5 It should be obvious in this context that the question in what sense (if any) “private law” is 
private is a controversial one. Here, I therefore use this term simply as shorthand for the law of contract, 
tort, property and restitution. 
6 To the best of my knowledge the only two works, both written by the same person, that attempt 
a similar examination of House of Lords decisions are Robertson (1982, 1998:ch.  2). 
7 According to the so-called “two-stage test” in order to establish duty of care in a negligence 
claim the plaintiff needs to show, first, that harm to her was foreseeable and, second, that there are 
no countervailing policy considerations against the imposition of duty. The “three-stage test” requires 
showing that harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, that the parties were “proximate,” and that it is “fair, 
just, and reasonable” to impose liability. The main change between the tests, then, is that in the latter 
the onus is on the plaintiff to show that policy considerations favor the imposition of liability, even 
when there was sufficient proximity between the parties. In the former approach showing that harm 
was foreseeable created a presumption that a duty of care existed, which the defendant could counter 
by adducing countervailing policy considerations. 
8 The Canadian Supreme Court explicitly endorsed this view in Cooper v. Hobart (2000:[27]): “Anns 
did not purport to depart from the negligence test of Donoghue v. Stevenson but merely sought to 
elucidate it by explicitly recognizing its policy component.” Even if Anns went somewhat beyond what 
was established in Dorset Yacht, that is a common- place in the history of the common law, as developments 
in twentieth century tort law attest. 
9 Incidentally, the legal error view was explicitly rejected by the Privy Council in Invercargill City 
Council v. Hamlin (1996:642), where it is stated that in this area “there is no single right correct answer” 
but rather different responses based “at least in part on policy considerations . . . [that depend on] 
community standards and expectations.” The Council affirmed the New Zealand’s courts’ adoption of a 
different legal analysis. 
10  Atiyah proposed a similar explanation for developments in contract law during the same period 
in Atiyah (1986:355–85). 
11 Even literature critical of the solidarity thesis (e.g., Kynaston  2007:39–56,  esp. 55–56; Lowe 
1990:174–78), acknowledges a significant elite minority that was sufficient for establishing the Post-War 
consensus. 
12 On other issues, such as immigration or relations with Europe, there were  still marked differences 
between Labour and the Conservatives. 
13 Macmillan was clearly inspired by Childs’s (1936) Sweden: The Middle Way, which he briefly  
discusses  (1938:80–81). 
14 See also Kilmuir (1960). Kilmuir was the Conservative Lord Chancellor in 1954–62. By contrast, to 
conservatives of the next generation Macmillan’s book could “hardly count[]” as conservative (Willetts 
1992:34). 
15    Denning, characteristically, was among the first judges to recognize this already in 
White v. White (1950:58–59). 
16 In some of his remarks Atkin was willing to go  much  further  than  most  future courts. He 
suggested that “something might be said for . . . a shopkeeper on [a] route under repair who is for an 
unreasonably long time deprived of access to his premises for himself and his customers” (East Suffolk 
1941:91). 
17 Williams (1939), in an article on the foundations of tort liability,  does  not  even mention Donoghue; 
and in Landon (1939:346 n.s) it is stated that “all that Donoghue . . . has done is to add a new category of 
negligence to our law.” A few years later Landon (1941:181–83) praised East Suffolk for returning to the 
“traditional  exposition”  of  negli- gence that leaves the law “shorn of [the] terrors” of Donoghue. 
 18 The case involved a tort claim brought by several individuals suing the government for damages 
they suffered at the hands of a few juvenile delinquents who escaped from the youth prison (Borstal) at 
which they were held. 
19 In Anns the plaintiffs successfully sued the government for its failure to inspect properly the 
work of private building constructors that resulted in latent defects in the houses. 
20 The most important judges in this context are Lord Radcliffe, Lord Reid, and Lord Denning 
(Stevens 1978:445–59, 468–505). None of them could be described as a left-wing firebrand, and yet 
they all were, to varying degrees, willing to openly discuss the creative role of the judge and more open 
about the need to develop the common law to fit changing circumstances. 
21  This was quoted approvingly by Lord Denning M.R. and Edmund-Davies L.J. in 
Dorset Yacht (1969:426, 433). 
22 From a purely doctrinal perspective the way Sachs L.J., who also sat on the panel in Dutton 
(1972:402–03), bypassed the precedent of East Suffolk by distinguishing it as dealing with omission is no 
less problematic. 
23 Compare Denning’s statement in Dorset Yacht (1969:426): “This talk of ‘duty’ or ‘no duty’ is 
simply a way of limiting the range of liability.” 
24 Contrast Green (1991:88), who said that Thatcher’s “Conservative government . . . had very little 
to do with Conservatism,” with Willetts (1992:47), who emphasizes the continuities. 
25   Goodin (1998:102) quotes Thatcher’s praise for exactly these values. 
26   The full quote is found in Willetts (1992:47–48). 
27    “Margaret Thatcher was often credited, when she was in office, with defending tort liability as a 
system of personal responsibility” Atiyah (1996:1). 
28 Legal economists would draw the line at the point in which it is cheaper for the potential 
injurer to prevent the harm than it is for the victim. But rights-based libertarian accounts (e.g., Epstein 
1973:151–52; Huber 1990:6) tend to dismiss or underplay the role cost-benefit analysis in the question of 
determining individuals’ responsibilities  to  each other. 
29 Such ideas can be identified in the cases only a decade or more later. See Gorringe v. Calderdale 
Metropolitan Borough Council (2004:[32]); Tomlinson v. Congleton B.C. (2003:81). 
30 Scruton adds: “postal service[, for example,] is indispensable to the life of the community . . . 
Automatically, therefore, the maintenance of a postal service becomes one of the responsibilities of 
government.” Nonetheless, “[t]he state’s relation to the citizen is not, and cannot be, contractual. . . . 
The state has the authority, the responsibility, and the despotism of parenthood.” 
31 This view is correlative to the old Tory deferential attitude towards state institutions; they both 
came under attack during Thatcher’s years in power (Horton 2006:32–48, 38–41). 
32 One need only look at the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal to see a completely 
different attitude to the relation between citizen and state and hence to liability of public authorities. 
What is treated in the Privy Council as an innocent mistake that does not undermine the sense in which 
the minister is a committed public servant, is described by the New Zealand court in Takaro Properties Ltd 
v. Rowling (1986:74) as failure to seek legal advice. Contrary to the New Zealand court’s insistence on 
the importance of government officials complying with the law, the Privy Council’s decision stated that 
“it is very difficult to identify any particular case in which it can properly be said that a minister is under a 
duty to seek legal advice” (Rowling v. Takaro Properties Ltd. 1988:502). It is worth noting that a decade 
later the Privy Council conceded that the New Zealand approach reflected a different political 
attitude, and upheld a decision affirming Anns and rejecting Murphy. See note 9. 
33 Cf. Home Office v. Harman (1981:557–58). A similar attitude is found also in some academic 
writing, such as Weir (1989:46–47): “In the circumstances, it would be foolish to deplete the meagre 
resources available [to public authorities] by requiring them to be paid out by way of damages (or 
contribution) rather than by way of repair and maintenance, especially as it is clear that those at the 
sharp end really are keen to do a good job with the resources available, though they will doubtless 
screw up on occasion.” 
34    See also Lord Keith’s fear of “overkill” from the imposition of tort liability in Rowling 
v. Takaro Properties Ltd. (1988:502) and Murphy (1991:472). 
35   The passage quoted in the text does not appear in the last edition of the book, but I mention 
this quote here only to illustrate how very different this view is from what one actually finds in court 
decisions from the 1980s. 
36   It is also impossible to dismiss the possibility that their reasons for shying away from the  New  
Right  view  may  have  had  a  personal  element.  Thatcher’s  New  Right  circle 
“counterpose[d] producers and parasites, the latter including both the old aristocracy and the whole of 
the public sector” (Levitas 1986:9), and many senior judges could have been classified as members of 
both. More directly, when late in premiership Thatcher has sought to implement a more “managerial” 
approach to the justice system, the judges opposed what they thought were attempts to treat their services 
“like the grocer’s shop at the corner of the street” (Stevens 1993:176, quoting Lord Hailsham, at the time 
a former Conservative Lord Chancellor; also Browne-Wilkinson 1988:48–51). 
 37 Of course, judges in all jurisdictions vow to base their arguments on law alone and often present 
their decisions as though reached on the basis of legal analysis. Most com- mentators agree that British 
judges are more concerned with maintaining the separation of law from politics, and one of the means 
by which they seek to do so is by not adjudicating on questions like abortion, desegregation, provision of 
health care, the financing of political campaigns and so on. Many British judges (e.g., Bingham 
2011:141–43; Devlin 1979:6–8; McCluskey 1987:35, 52–54) have expressed reservations on American 
courts’ tendency to decide on politically controversial questions. Consequently, it is much rarer to read 
about the political orientation of British judges in the way one finds so frequently with regard to 
American judges. 
38 Why this significant change has happened is beyond the scope of this article, but I think has to 
do with different political theories (cf. Priel 2012). Underlying the American system is the idea that 
sovereignty is ultimately vested in the people and delegated to the government, and that a central 
task of the courts is to protect individuals against a government that abuses or exceeds its given 
powers, something that requires engaging in political questions in order to examine whether the state 
oversteps its given powers. In Britain, by contrast, the prevailing view has been described as 
“unique among modern democracies . . . [in] lack[ing] any notion of popular sovereignty” (Johnson 
1985:230–34). As the powers of the British state are not thought to be delegated from the people, it is 
easier for the courts to avoid politically controversial questions. 
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